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BOOKS REVIEWED
Civil Liberties and the Constitution. Paul G. Kauper. Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press. 1962. Pp. xxii, 237. $6.00.
The Constitution, as a protection of civil liberties, is an object of considerable
interest. Unfortunately, even among the legal profession, the general understanding
is inexact and often beclouded by emotional reactions. It was a service, therefore,
when Professor Paul G. Kauper of the University of Michigan Law School published
in this little volume the text of the lectures he gave at the 1961 Special Summer
School for lawyers held at that school. While this is basically a handbook, it is not
exactly light reading, for the author has successfully avoided the pitfall of popular
oversimplification while compendiously summarizing the basic problems and the
operative principles. This is a book which the law student and the la,yer could
well read with profit.
In his opening treatment of the problem of church and state, Professor K1auper
reveals that he does not adhere to the absolutist school of constitutional interpretation and he asserts "the problems in this area cannot be solved by resort to
doctrinaire absolutes, verbal formulae, or metaphors." (p. 19.) After pointing out
that critical church-state issues turn on the interpretation given to the establishment
clause of the first amendment providing that Congress and, by interpretation, the
states shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, the author examines
the Sunday dosing laws, birth control legislation, aid to education and religion in
public schools.
In each case, he favors the balancing of the competing interests at stake. For
instance, he criticizes Mr. Justice Black's dictum in E'erson iv.Board of Edric.1 that
Government cannot aid any or all religions, as contrary to accepted practice and an
extension of the establishment clause far beyond its nature and purpose. There are
some who seek to find in the few Supreme Court decisions on church and state a
dear prohibition against general federal aid to parochial schools. Professor Kauper,
however, finds nothing to support such a conclusion. Indeed, he states that, "if
the actual holding in Everson means anything, it points in the opposite direction."
(p. 14.) Especially in view of the later holding in Zoracls v. Clausont2 and the
Court's allowance there of a measure of government cooperation with religions, the
author finds it surprising that the Everson dictum is quoted as if it were the last
word on the subject.
Professor Kauper ably employs the Sunday closing law cases 3 to support his
conclusion that governmental action serving a valid public purpose does not become
invalid merely because it "operates simultaneously to promote religious interests
either generally or of a particular group." (p. 22.) In fact, as the author recognizes, an overzealous adherence to the supposed principle that Government cannot
aid religion may well discriminate against religion and impair its free exercise, contrary to the further express command of the first amendment.
Cutting through many of the intricately constructed arguments against Government
support for religion, Professor Kauper makes the trenchant observation, "it seems
1.

330 US. 1, 15-16 (1947).

2. 343 U.S. 306 (1992).
3. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 365 US.
599 (1961).
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to me that so much of the opposition to aid for parochial schools stems from a
feeling against these schools as though there were something almost un-American
about them." (p. 45.) While not taking a position on the desirability of aid to parochial schools as a matter of policy, he concludes that "Congress may grant some
assistance to these schools as part of a program of spending for the general welfare,
so long as the funds are so limited and their expenditures so directed as not to be
a direct subsidy for religious teaching." (p. 51.) The last qualification, however, raises
some serious doubts. Who is to say, for example, at what point government aid to
language teaching in a parochial school becomes aid to the teaching of catechism
in that school through the release of funds which the school formerly had to devote
to its language program but which it now can spend on catechisms? To determine
a specific case on the directness or indirectness of the subsidy would seem to invite
arbitrary and unpredictable distinctions.
Professor Kauper believes in a sensible pragmatic approach to the first amendment.
His practical turn of mind is shown by his opinion that acceptance of public assistance
by parochial schools will require "submission to controls that properly accompany
grants of public funds." There are some who overemphasize the fairness aspect of the
problem, properly complaining that to aid public but not parochial schools would be
invidious discrimination, and they appear to beg the question whether any aid is
desirable at all. There is no such thing as free federal money, and Congress is under
an obvious duty to regulate the expenditure of funds it appropriates. Those who uncritically advocate federal aid would be well advised to consider the inevitability
thereupon of some federal control. This is especially important in light of the school
prayer case, Engel v. Vitale,4 which may be the forerunner of future decisions ensuring
that publicly controlled schools will be wholly secularized.
Professor Kauper applies his welcome common sense also to questions of obscenity,
censorship and antisubversive legislation. In each case, he illustrates the pragmatic nature of American constitutionalism and favors a balancing of competing interests. Only
such a balancing can justify the imposition of restrictions on the Communist Party
and, at the same time, the voiding of similar strictures against the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. But the author does recognize that
the absolutist approach of Mr. Justice Black has some merit in that it highlights the
fact that, within the limits of what is free speech, there can be no abridgment of
that freedom. The problems arise in deciding what is protected free speech and what
constitutes an abridgment. In making those decisions even the abstractionists must
resort to a weighing and balancing of competing considerations. It must be noted,
however, that Professor Kauper's positive program for combating Communism is
less stellar than his analysis of the legal problems involved. He minimizes the
efficacy of criminal sanctions against domestic conspirators and suggests instead that
we "challenge Communism in the open market place of ideas" and shore up "democracy at home." (pp. 125-26.) The author seems to designate "poverty, disease,
ignorance, and exploitation" as our major nemeses. He appears not very impressed
by the conspiratorial, messianic nature of Communism and the rapidity with which
it is achieving its objectives while we seek to pacify its agents and pursue aims extraneous to its elimination as a militant threat.
In another chapter of this solid book, Professor Kauper clarifies the distinction
between private and state action which is so essential to fourteenth amendment
interpretation. Properly, he concludes that in such cases as the trespass prosecutions
4.

370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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of the "sit-in" demonstrators, the real question is not whether there is "state
action" in convicting the defendants (there obviously is), but whether that state
action results from an untenable preference of the rights of the property owner
over the rights of the excluded Negro. Again, the problem is seen as one of the
balancing of competing interests.
The final chapter is devoted to a discussion of the effect of the federal system
upon civil liberties. Distinguishing "civil liberties," i.e., liberties or freedoms that
may be asserted as against the exercise of governmental power, from "civil rights,"
i.e., the rights and privileges that a person may assert against other persons, the author
dwells on the expanding role of the federal government. In addition to its power
to enforce the rights protected under the due process and equal protection clauses
of the fourteenth amendment, Congress can employ several of its specific powers
in dealing with civil rights as well as civil liberties. Thus, for example, Congress
can exercise its power over interstate commerce to prevent racial discrimination by
interstate carriers even where the usual state action is not present. Significantly,
the author acknowledges the efficacy of federal executive action and the federal
equity decree in enforcing constitutional guarantees, but he seems to believe that
full protection of the right to vote and other rights will await further action by
Congress.
This book is a worthwhile contribution. It provides a ready introduction to the
deeper intricacies of constitutional law, and it is to be recommended particularly
for the law student or attorney who is unable to devote extensive research to civil
liberties questions.
CHAP.s E. RacI*

Render unto Caesar: The Flag Salute Controversy. David R. AManvaring.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1962. Pp. x, 321. $5.50.
Every decision of the Supreme Court teaches something, but it is doubtful that
many decisions of the Court contain more lessons, or more variegated ones, than
does West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette.1 It teaches, inter alia, the following: (1) that a controversy which makes no sense except in terms of religious
liberty can be satisfactorily disposed of without reference to religious liberty;
(2) that when the Constitution forbids laws "abridging the freedom of speech,"
it means also those abridging the freedom of nonspeech; (3) that placing the palm
of the right hand above the right eye in salute is a form of speech and that refusal
to do so is, therefore, an exercise of the freedom of nonspeech; (4) that the Court
follows the law reviews as much as it does the election returns; (5) that the common
assumption among lawyers that dismissal for want of a substantial federal question
means that the appellant's claims are so wanting in merit that the Court will not
waste its time hearing oral argument thereon is erroneous, and that such a dismissal means only that the appellant's counsel may have better luck next time
and what has he got to lose by trying again, furthermore, no additional significance or
meaning accrues by reason of the fact that the dismissal for want of a substantial
federal question is the third or fourth such dismissal on the same question within a
* Assistant Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law.
1. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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period of a few years; (6) that on occasions, not only may the Court decide a
case before hearing oral argument or reading the parties' briefs, but it may write a
truly great opinion without any help from the briefs or oral argument so that constitutional law practitioners (such as this reviewer) may be entirely expendable.
There are many other lessons that can be learned from Barnette, but these are
enough to show why it is such an interesting and exciting case. It is to Professor
Manwaring's credit that his book conveys much of this interest and excitement.
By any standard, Barnette is one of the milestones in the progress of American
constitutional law, and Mr. Justice Jackson's eloquent and often quoted opinion
in the case is a document that should occupy a prominent place in the literature
of American liberties. On the whole, Professor Manwaring's book is an excellent
account of the events leading to the decision, the decision itself and, somewhat
abbreviated, its aftermath. The author has not contented himself with a study of
published material but has examined the archives of the American Civil Liberties
Union, which played a leading role in the entire flag salute controversy, and has
personally interviewed many of the dramatis personae.
Professor Manwaring is not a lawyer. Indeed, he is not even a teacher of law,
but of political science. Nevertheless, he exhibits little reticence in passing judgment
on the strategy of counsel or on the soundness of arguments presented by counsel
or adopted by courts. This reviewer, an active practitioner in the type of litigation
related in this book, would feel quite uncomfortable if his strategy and claims
were subjected to the same scrutiny as those of the attorneys in the various flag
salute cases. No small number of the arguments condemned by the author as
"frivolous" and "weird" seem quite reasonable, if not necessarily irrefutable, to
this reviewer, who probably would have made the same arguments had he been
counsel in the particular cases in which they were advanced.3
2. Conscientious objectors to military training in state universities apparently lack
the perseverance of conscientious objectors to flag saluting. In Coale v. Pearson, 290 U.S. 597
(1933) (per curiam), the Court dismissed for want of a substantial federal question an appeal
from a Maryland decision upholding compulsory military training against religiously
motivated objectors in a tax-supported university. The next year, in Hamilton v. Regents
of the Univ. of Calif., 293 U.S. 245 (1934), the Court found the claim sufficiently meritorious
to warrant a full-scale hearing of an appeal, but affirmed without dissent the adverse
state court decision. The objectors appeared to have lost hope at this point and abandoned
the battle. Perhaps had they persisted they might have gotten a dissent the next time
around and-who knows ?-ultimately even a majority. Conscientious objectors to compulsory Sunday observance laws may have greater persistence and may be rewarded by
better luck. In Friedman v. New York, 341 U.S. 907 (1951) (per curiam), the Court dismissed
for want of a substantial question an appeal brought by this reviewer from a decision upholding a state Sunday law against an Orthodox Jew who observed Saturday as his
Sabbath and refrained from secular business on that day. A decade later the same claim
and the same arguments in support of it were deemed sufficiently reasonable not only
to warrant the noting of probable jurisdiction but also to win the approval and acceptance
of three of the nine Justices. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617
(1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). It is safe to predict that the effort
will again be made, and it is possible that in some future attempt two additional Justices
may be persuaded, and victory will thus be achieved.
3. E.g., the author characterizes as "weird" the claim asserted in one case that a flag
salute requirement that does not include private schools discriminates arbitrarily against

1962]

BOOKS REVIEWED

From a legal approach, the author views the flag salute controversy as a struggle
between competing constitutional standards. On the one hand, there was the "secular
regulation" rule: "There is no constitutional right to excmption ofn rcligious grounds
from the compulsion of a general regulation dealing with non-religious Iatters'
(p. 51.) On the other, is the "weighing" standard: In any case in which a governmental regulation restricts the free exercise of religion, the reviewing court must
weigh the particular circumstances to determine whether the social need for conforruity with the regulation is great enough to override the individuas religious
claim. (p. 48.) The courts which, before Barnettc, upheld compulsory flag salute
regulations accepted the former standard; " those which reached a contrary conclusion espoused the latter.5 Paradoxically, Mr. Justice Jackson, speahing for the
majority in Barnette, invalidated the regulation but quite patently refused either
to adopt the "weighing" test or to reject the "secular regulation" rule.0 He accomplished this feat by deciding the case not as one involving freedom of religion, but
rather freedom of speech, even though in so doing he was required to interpret
the first amendment's ban on laws abridging freedom of speech as encompassing
not only freedom of silence (nonrecitation of the pledge of allegiance) but also of
inaction (nonsaluting of the flag).
Complicating the problem is the presence of a third possible test: the "dear
and present danger" test. Under this theory, a restriction on freedom of religion, as
of any other form of expression secured by the first amendment, is constitutionally
justifiable only if in the particular circumstances it is clearly and immediately
necessary to avert a danger which the Government has the right to avert. (pp. 52-55.)
This test, too, would seem to require invalidation of the compulsory flag salute
regulation, at least as enforced against the insignificantly few Jehovah's Witnesses'
children who conscientiously object to it, for can it be seriously urged that any
grave danger to the republic exists if the idiosyncracies of this tiny minority are
respected?
Professor Manwaring refuses to choose among these competing standards. Each,
he says, has its drawbacks, and "which is preferable would seem almost a matter
of taste." (p. 253.) The difficulty with the author's analysis is that these standards

are hardly as distinct and independent as he assumes. A conscientious objector is
bound by a "secular regulation" only if it accords with substantive due process, and
one of the factors that is certainly relevant in determining that question is whether
the regulation necessarily infringes upon religious rights protected by the first
amendment, including the right to the free exercise of religion. While Pierce v.

Society of Sisters7 was not technically a religious liberty case, as is evident from
the fact that a single decision and opinion encompass the secular Hill Military Academy as well as religious parochial schools, and the opinion does not even mention

children attending public schools. Mlanwaring, Render unto Caesar: The Flag Salute
Controversy 65 (1962). He characterizes as "bordering on the frivolous" the Jehovah's
Witnesses' "appeal to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
repeated arguments by the school authorities that public education is a privilege withdrawal of which does not raise a constitutional question." Id. at 35.
4. Alnersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.. 5S6 (1940); Gabrielli v. Knicherbooker, 12 Cal. 2d S5, 32 P.2d 391 (1933), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 621 (1939).
5. MIinersvile School Dist. v. Gobitis, 103 F.2d 633 (3d Cir. 1939).
6. 319 U.S. at 625-42.
7. 263 U.S. 510 (1925).
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religious liberty, nevertheless, it is quite obvious that a unanimous Court held the
"secular regulation" violative of due process, at least in part, because it interfered
with the rights of parents to raise their children religiously. A state may, without
violating due process, forbid the distribution of commercial handbills on public
streets, s but it may not forbid similar distribution of religious handbills 9 because in
the former case only business interests are affected whereas in the latter religious
freedom is restricted.
So too, "weighing" is necessarily involved in any application of the "clear
and present danger" test; the weightier the communal interest to be protected, the
less clear and immediate the danger to it must be in order to justify governmental
intervention.
But the real difficulty with Professor Manwaring's thesis is his assumption that
constitutional controversies are resolved by constitutional tests. His whole book
shows the unreality of that assumption. The explanation for the fact that children of
Jehovah's Witnesses attending public schools may not today be compelled to salute
the flag or pledge allegiance to it is not to be found in a judicial shifting from a
"secular regulation" test to a "clear and present danger" or "weighing" test. It is to
be found rather in facts such as the unanimous hostility to the contrary ruling in
Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis'o on the part of many law reviews, including every

Catholic law review in the country which commented on it. It was not a constitutional test that put Gobitis to rest; it was the enlightened conscience of the American
people.
LEo PFEFPER*

The Nuremberg Trial. Joe J. Heydecker and Johannes Leeb. Edited by R. A.
Downie. Cleveland and New York City: World Publishing Company. 1962. Pp.
398. $6.00.
To confine within the covers of a book under four hundred pages, a reasonably
accurate record of the Nuremberg Trial is quite a job. The trial of the Major Axis
War Criminals by the International Military Tribunal opened on November 20, 1945
and concluded on August 31, 1946. Excepting only the Japanese war crimes trial,
this was the longest trial in history. Any account of a trial involving nineteen individual defendants, a sixteen thousand page trial record, over thirty-three hundred
documents, two hundred and forty witnesses and well over a hundred lawyers
necessarily involves an editing task of fantastic proportions. The authors have not
attempted to "brief" the trial. Rather, they have taken a somewhat unique approach
in that they have attempted to use the record of the trial as a framework of reference
around which to weave a sequential historical record of the major facts and factors
in Nazi history which brought the leaders of Nazi Germany to the dock at Nuremberg. Quite properly is the book subtitled, "A History of Nazi Germany as Revealed Through the Testimony at Nuremberg."
Here we find briefly and lucidly set forth the prime incidents in the course of
conduct adopted by the leaders of Nazi Germany from 1933 to the G6tterdiammerung
8. Valentine
9. Schneider
10. 310 U.S.
* David W.

v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
586 (1940).
Petegorsky Professor of Constitutional Law, Yeshiva University.
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of 1945. True, the niceties of political hierarchy within the National Socialist Party
are not set forth in sufficient detail to satisfy the student of the era. However, there
is more than enough background information to provide the interested reader with
a solid outline as a springboard for more particular research. Here will be found
succinctly stated the theory of the Nuremberg Trials as well as an outline of the
indictment charging conspiracy, crimes against peace, war crimes and crimes against
humanity. There is adequate information to acquaint the reader with the personality
and background of each individual defendant. For euxample, while there are indications
that Hermann Goering was widely considered by his German contemporaries to be
the "modem man of the Renaissance" with an I.Q. (as determined by American
psychiatrists) of a surprising 138, nevertheless, the reader is quickly disabused
of the image of geniality by repeated references to documentary evidence of his
gross criminal conduct, such as the stenographic transcript of a meeting attended
by Goering as early as November 12, 1938 quoting him: "It is absurd to empty
and set fire to a Jewish store when a German insurance company has to cover the
damage.. . " (p. 168.) It is appropriate to note that the authenticity of not one
of the documents introduced into evidence at the trial vas questioned by any
defendant.
This volume has greater significance than an ordinary work of this character in
that it was written by two German newspapermen, one of whom had served for
six years in the German Army during World War II and who had attended the
entire trial. The book was originally published in German by Berlin publishers in
1958. With a background such as this, the reader avidly searches its pages for expressions of opinion by its German authors to learn the effect of the trial upon
Germany and the postwar German. This search proves most unrewarding since there
is only one indication in the entire book as to the effect the trial may have had in
their country. The authors' research has been accurate. They have not flinched at
disclosing the most bestial acts of torture and execution by their fellow countrymen
but limit their comment on all the horrors set forth to the single question. "Have
these things been consigned to oblivion already?" (p. 347.) Of course, the very fact
of their authorship and the publication of this book in Germany is indicative of
their intention that an impartial and continuing effort be made so that the Germany
of today and the world shall not forget the horror unleashed upon the western world
by the maniacal ideology of National Socialism.
While one should not criticize a book for what it is not, nevertheless, it is
to be regretted that a volume which is clearly a result of considerable research
should not have been the subject of more detailed annotation and identification of
source material. While a reviewer cannot undertake the task of research to verify
the accuracy of unannotated quotations; nevertheless, where one has participated
in the work of the trial, it is only fair to note that this reviewer has no quarrel
with either the accuracy of the documentary proof or the type of documents
selected to reflect the fact and flavor of those momentous times. Of course, reference
to many documents of prime interest has been omitted in the interest of brevity,
but a sufficient number have been included lending great power and authenticity to
this historical record. A prime example of the type of document used to verify and
support the accuracy of the authors' job of reporting are the stenographic minutes
of Hitler's conferences (the original notes and transcripts as unearthed by Army
Intelligence and Office of Strategic Services personnel), Jodl's Diary and the German
Army (O.K.W.) records (two carloads of which were captured by the American
Army together with their cataloging personnel, who assisted at the trial).
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The authors' work is one, which is in a sense, too strictly objective. In truth, it
is repertorial in style and might well have been completely written in 1946, so
substantially does it ignore the many years which have passed, the subsequent
trials which resulted from this first major trial and the continuing efforts of the
West German Government to apprehend the so called "lesser" war criminals. The
book is clearly intended to have as wide a readership as possible and makes intelligible,
on a broad basis, the highlighted war crimes which were written up in rather spasmodic fashion at the time of the trial. It does a good job of identifying the defendants and briefly advising the reader of the posture each defendant assumed
or claimed to have had thrust upon him during the days when he controlled the
destinies of the German people. The authors have skirted most of the complexities
which plagued the allied staff of lawyers in their preparation for trial. Questions
such as the interlocking relationships of governmental, quasi-governmental, paramilitary and political bodies are intentionally omitted, and to this extent, the work
is guilty at times of an oversimplification of the complex issues involved. The
problems of jurisdiction and international law, which have been and still are of
considerable interest to all lawyers, have been almost completely ignored. Thus,
we are left with a straight-forward, factual recital of the more important incidents
indicating the proof of the crimes charged. But for the fact that this reviewer saw
the documents, talked to the defendants and witnesses and worked with the lawyers
and the judges, this could be a fantastic novel embodying the wildest imaginings of
an Edgar Allan Poe. Indeed, the cold factual recital of the murder of millions of
innocent victims is almost incredible even to the informed.
While one could have wished for a more definitive and detailed work from two
such well-informed authors, the book is a valuable addition to the literature on
this subject in days such as these when the Hitler technique of simulating and stimulating so called "aggressive" conduct by peace-loving nations is once again in vogue.
A book which recounts and warns the world against submitting to the evils of
power abused to the nth degree, of gross irresponsibility in high office, of amorality
at all levels of government and of cruel disregard for the rights of the individual,
is a book that can always be welcomed.
WILLIAM H. COOoAN*
* Member of Sullivan, Donovan, Hanrahan, McGovern & Lane; Chief, Documents
Division, International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 1945.

